About the journal. After correcting for these issues, I argue that this causal framework reveals something quite different. This article develops a new, general account of replication (the Resampling Account of replication). Since its inception in 1934, Philosophy of Science, along with its sponsoring society, the Philosophy of Science Association, has been dedicated to the furthering of studies and free discussion from diverse standpoints in the philosophy of science. Nonsubscribers: Purchase the e-book of this issue, Frequency: 5 issues/year, including conference proceedings ISSN: 0031-8248 E-ISSN: 1539-767X2018 JCR Impact Factor*: 1.217 Ranked #10 out of 62 in History & Philosophy of Science. COVID-19 Pandemic Update: The Editorial Team at Philosophy of Science will be proceeding as normally as possible during this challenging time. Philosophy of Science is published five times per year. The December issue contains the PSA conference Proceedings. There is a vast literature within philosophy of mind that focuses on artificial intelligence but hardly mentions methodological questions. This article examines the multiple realizability thesis within a causal framework. e-Book access is included with your membership. The interpretation is novel in that it allows one to explain the success of the theoretical structure of classical mechanics. It reveals how multiple realizability relates to a common type of causal complexity in biology that poses problems for reductive explanation. For over fifty years, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science has published innovative and thought-provoking work in the philosophy of science, opening up new directions in the field and shedding new light on well-known issues. On this basis, I argue that the common notion of conceptual replication is confused and that the ongoing controversy about the relative value of direct and conceptual replications should be dissolved. Scientists depend on complex computational systems that are often ineliminably opaque, to the detriment of our ability to give scientific explanations and detect artifacts. This provides analogous notions of pragmatic underdetermination and pragmatic reliability with respect to a particular goal, as well as a principled method for extracting solvable problems from unsolvable ones. The journal contains essays, discussion articles, and book reviews. Comparativism is the view that comparative confidences (e.g., being more confident that P than that Q) are more fundamental than degrees of belief (e.g., believing that P with some strength x). While Sober’s causal approach has the potential to reveal new insights, I argue that his setup fails to capture important aspects of the multiple realizability thesis. Insights from neurocognitive science illuminate how relevant similarities between models and targets are picked out, how modeling inferences are justified, and the metaphysical status of models. View content coverage periods and institutional full-run subscription rates for the Philosophy of Science. Thomas Polger and Lawrence Shapiro claim that unlike human-made artifacts cases of multiple realization in naturally occurring systems are uncommon. Since its inception in 1934, Philosophy of Science, along with its sponsoring society, the Philosophy of Science Association, has been dedicated to the furthering of studies and free discussion from diverse standpoints in the philosophy of science. I argue that the standard interpretation of the result in the literature is misguided and that a better reading does not, in fact, support Occam’s Razor at all. Welcome to the Editorial pages of the journal Philosophy of Science, the official journal of the Philosophy of Science Association. To learn more about the benefits of membership, click below. Drawing on cases from systems biology, I argue that multiple realization in naturally occurring systems is not as uncommon as Polger and Shapiro initially thought. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics and Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences will merge with this journal in January 2021. I then propose an extension of the standard framework, where inquiry is constrained by both epistemic and nonepistemic factors. Download this issue now: *Journal Impact Factors courtesy of the 2019, Transparency in Complex Computational Systems, From Implausible Artificial Neurons to Idealized Cognitive Models: Rebooting Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, Multiple Realizability from a Causal Perspective, PAC Learning and Occam’s Razor: Probably Approximately Incorrect, ‘Ramseyfying’ Probabilistic Comparativism, institutional full-run subscription rates. Of all published articles, the following were the most read within the past 12 months. I outline the basis for a new, nonprobabilistic version of comparativism inspired by a suggestion made by Frank Ramsey in “Probability and Partial Belief.” I show how, and to what extent, ‘Ramseyan comparativism’ might be used to weaken the (unrealistically strong) probabilistic coherence conditions that comparativism traditionally relies on. Find out more. I show that network motifs with entirely different underlying causal structures can perform the same function of interest. We are dedicated to keeping things running as smoothly and efficiently as possible. I propose a framework for pragmatic reliability in-the-limit criteria, extending the epistemic reliability framework. We contract with the University of Chicago Press for journal publishing and membership management services. I identify some common scientific contexts that complicate the application or interpretation of epistemic reliability criteria, drawing heavily from economics for illustrative examples. There is also a growing body of work in philosophy of science about modeling methodology that hardly mentions examples from cognitive science. The relevant cases, which I draw from systems biology, involve generalizable design principles called network motifs, which recur in different organisms and species and perform specific functions. Find out more here. The article also considers the scope problem of multiple realization. Members of the Editorial Team and our dedicated reviewers, like academics globally, face new challenges balancing sheltering at home, teaching remotely, caring for family members of all ages, and supporting our departments and communities more generally. Computer scientists have provided a distinct justification of Occam’s Razor. I argue that a replication is an experiment that resamples the experimental components of an original experiment that are treated as random factors and that the function of replications is, narrowly, to assess the reliability of the replicated experiments. The journal contains essays, discussion articles, and book reviews. To this end, I state and prove a very similar theorem that, if interpreted the same way, would justify the contradictory Anti-Occam’s Razor—the principle that we should favor more complex hypotheses. The argument relies on a philosophical interpretation of the theorem. *Journal Impact Factors courtesy of the 2019 Journal Citation Reports (JCR) (Clarivate Analytics, 2020). This targets the transparency most useful for a task, avoiding instrumentalism by providing partial transparency when full transparency is impossible. The four regular issues are dated January, April, July, and October of each year. Since its inception in 1934, Philosophy of Science, along with its sponsoring society, the Philosophy of Science Association, has been dedicated to the furthering of studies and free discussion from diverse standpoints in the philosophy of science. There will inevitably be delays in some cases, and we ask for your patience. I argue that it is possible to give an interpretation of the classical ℏ→0 limit of quantum mechanics that results in a partial explanation of the success of classical mechanics. The Journal for General Philosophy of Science (JGPS) is a forum for original research and discussion in the philosophy of science. Some philosophers have suggested treating opaque systems instrumentally, but computer scientists developing strategies for increasing transparency are correct in finding this unsatisfying. Its subject matter encompasses both general philosophy of science and the specialized philosophies of particular areas of science, such as the philosophy of physics, the philosophy of biology, the philosophy of the social sciences, and the philosophies of the … Instead, I propose an analysis of transparency as having three forms: transparency of the algorithm, the realization of the algorithm in code, and the way that code is run on particular hardware and data. Insights developed in the philosophy of science literature about the importance of idealization provide a way of understanding the neural implausibility of connectionist networks. Here these discussions are connected. This interpretation clarifies the relationship between physical quantities and propositions in quantum theories and provides a precise notion of a quantum theory holding “approximately on certain scales.”.